I have translated this statement from the group that helped draft the constitutional complaints, so I can share it on here (due to its length it is split into two parts, continue reading in the replies):
Statement on the Federal Constitutional Court’s Ruling on Child-Like Sex Dolls
In June 2021, the legislature enacted the Act to Combat Sexual Violence Against Children, which, among other things, criminalized the acquisition, possession, manufacture, and trade of sex dolls with a childlike appearance (child sex dolls) Section § 184l of the German Criminal Code (StGB). The penalties range from a fine to up to five years’ imprisonment for manufacturing or distribution, and up to three years’ imprisonment for possession—and are, remarkably, identical to the penalties for child trafficking under Section § 236(1)–(3) StGB.
In response to this law, which we, too, have sharply criticized, two constitutional complaints (2 BvR 1096/22 and 2 BvR 1097/22) were filed by doll owners with the Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) in Karlsruhe. The petitioners argued that the ban is unconstitutional because it constitutes an unjustified infringement of their general right of personality and their right to sexual self-determination. Furthermore, the petitioners argued that pedophilia constitutes a disability, since it at least makes it difficult for those affected to participate in society on an equal footing, and thus also constitutes a violation of the prohibition against discrimination on the basis of disability. Furthermore, the complainants saw a violation of the requirement of specificity, since the law does not define clearly enough what exactly constitutes a child sex doll and is therefore now prohibited.
On July 2, 2026, the Second Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court finally announced its ruling and dismissed both constitutional complaints by a vote of 6 to 2. The prohibition under Section 184l of the Criminal Code is thus deemed to be in conformity with the Constitution. Justice Offenloch, one of the two dissenting voices, published his dissenting opinion in the form of a separate opinion, in which he criticized the ruling and the reasoning provided by the Senate majority, and quite aptly described the ban as “moral legislation without a sufficiently rational basis.” This is quite a rarity; over the past 55 years, there have been only 108 separate opinions in total.
The Federal Constitutional Court’s reasoning is based essentially on two arguments: that the existence of child sex dolls would violate the dignity of children, and that it cannot be ruled out with sufficient certainty that such dolls could lower the inhibition threshold for sexual assaults. Both arguments are flawed and incomplete, lack any empirical basis, and should in no case justify far-reaching infringements on fundamental rights. In this statement, we aim to explain why, like Justice Offenloch, we consider the decision to be a miscarriage of justice. The impact of the ruling extends far beyond the issue of child sex dolls and even beyond the issue of pedophilia. With this ruling, the Federal Constitutional Court has fundamentally weakened fundamental rights in Germany.
1. Argument: Dolls portray children as available sex objects and thereby infringe upon children’s dignity
According to the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court, a ban on child sex dolls is justified simply because they violate children’s dignity. Dolls constitute a dehumanizing depiction intended to “create in the viewer the impression that a child is available as a sexual object with whom one can do as one pleases” (para. 126). This, in turn, could lead to a creeping normalization and ultimately to societal acceptance of sexual acts involving children.
In this regard, it must first be noted—and this is actually a trivial fact—that dolls are simply not children, and this is obvious to everyone. Nevertheless, the Senate fails to provide any explanation as to why the availability of child-like sex dolls should lead the viewer to immediately conclude that children, too, are available for sex. Likewise, the Senate fails to recognize that pedophiles generally seek to acquire dolls precisely because they do not wish to harm real children and thus wish to preserve their dignity.
Equally incomprehensible is the notion that legalizing child-like sex dolls poses a risk that sexual acts involving children could gradually become normalized. Sexual contact between adults and children is one of society’s greatest taboos, which—as Judge Offenloch also emphasizes in his dissenting opinion—is strictly prohibited under criminal law and carries severe penalties. It remains unclear how the availability of a niche product such as child sex dolls could specifically pose such a threat. After all, child sex dolls have been around for quite some time, and during the years when such dolls were still legal, sexual acts involving children were likely just as strongly rejected by society as they are today. Essentially, this is a “slippery slope” argument without any comprehensible basis in reality.
In the explanatory memorandum to the law, the legislature stated at the time that the ban on dolls was intended, in particular, to send a signal “that children—even if they are merely physical replicas—must not be made into objects of sexual behavior.” This rationale was already questionable at the time and seemed aimed more at punishing pedophiles than at protecting children. The Federal Constitutional Court, however, goes even further here and derives from this a “special duty on the part of the state to protect children’s self-determination by preventing children from becoming instruments and objects of adult sexuality” (para. 112). This, the Court states, stems from the special duty of protection that the state owes to defenseless children.
This argument by the Federal Constitutional Court is particularly alarming, as it essentially calls for nothing less than the eradication of pedophilia. The fact is, there is a certain segment of the population that is pedophilic, who typically realize this during puberty and cannot change it. This means that one can find children sexually attractive, that they are an integral part of one’s own sexuality, and that one must find a way to cope with it. Pedophilia is simply a form of sexuality, not a mental illness that one is led into when pedophilia has been “insidiously normalized” to too great an extent. At best, the state’s obligation—as construed by the Federal Constitutional Court—to prevent the sexualization of children can be interpreted as a call to criminalize all remaining legal alternatives for dealing with pedophilic sexuality, such as stories and drawings. At worst, the BVerfG is calling for the eradication of pedophilic desire itself, which could be used to justify even measures that violate human rights, such as involuntary commitment and forced castration.
2. Argument: Inhibitions against sexual assault could be lowered
While the first argument is purely moral, the Federal Constitutional Court’s second argument addresses potential dangers that might arise from the availability of dolls. Central to this is the fear that the use of dolls could lower inhibitions against real-life assaults. According to the ruling, a ban on child sex dolls is therefore legitimate in order to eliminate a potential source of danger to children.
However, the Federal Constitutional Court does not explain at any point exactly how the use of dolls is supposed to lower inhibitions against assaults on children. As its sole explanation, it merely cites arguments by Prof. Klaus Beier and Dr. Elisabeth Quendler-Adamo from the “Kein Täter Werden” (KTW) project, according to which the use of dolls could promote a “perceptual distortion” or cause the behavior associated with their use to become “automated.” Both lines of reasoning assume that doll owners cannot distinguish between their dolls and real children, and might eventually come to believe that they can treat children in the same way as their dolls. However, the notion that doll owners are unaware that they have purchased an object that, while outwardly modeled after children, is not itself a child, seems highly questionable and at the very least requires further explanation—which the ruling does not provide.
In any case, there is no evidence to support this bold thesis, a fact that the Federal Constitutional Court itself acknowledges. Initial empirical studies have so far failed to find any evidence of a lowered inhibition threshold; on the contrary, some have even found indications that the likelihood of sexual assaults is actually reduced by the dolls. The Court itself acknowledges this in principle as well (para. 9). Nevertheless, according to the BVerfG, there is sufficient evidence to make an increase in risk seem plausible, and the overall factual situation is unclear enough that a ban by the legislature is justified despite all this. This is also problematic because there is evidence in the literature of a preventive benefit: in the worst-case scenario, therefore, the existing ban has concrete negative effects on child protection.
Three interviews with Beier and Quendler-Adamo, in which they expressed their opposition to child sex dolls, play a central role in the argument. All three pieces, however, approach the topic in a fundamentally biased and one-sided manner. Among these sources is a short and highly sensationalist article on RTL, in which Beier expressed his concern “that the use of the dolls could actually lead to a relaxation of behavioral control.” In a video report by the Y-Kollektiv, which is also cited in the ruling, he further described the dolls as a risk factor, even though he simultaneously stated that he actually sees no risk at all—at least among the clients under his care. And in a television segment for SAT.1, Quendler-Adamo from the KTW facility in Ulm stated that she views the use of dolls critically and fears a creeping normalization. In addition, she stated in the interview that all of her clients who were surveyed believed that child-like sex dolls would not help them avoid committing offenses.
Neither Beier nor Quendler-Adamo explain how they arrived at their assessments or on what expert basis they are founded. Neither has conducted any research in this field, and neither refers to clear-cut facts but rather to personal concerns and vague fears that they do not further substantiate in their arguments. It is nothing short of astonishing that the Federal Constitutional Court nevertheless gives greater weight to their statements than to several peer-reviewed scholarly articles, some of which directly refute their fears. Quendler-Adamo’s statement that her clients do not believe dolls would help them is, in turn, irrelevant to the matter at hand for two reasons. For one thing, these patients would likely not purchase dolls even if they were legal. Furthermore, rights are not contingent on whether granting them has a therapeutic benefit. Finally, it is also noteworthy that the court refrained from obtaining an expert opinion from Beier or Quendler-Adamo—which would have forced them to substantiate their statements with professional evidence—and instead considers the unsubstantiated fears expressed on private television to a lay audience to be sufficient to legitimize a criminal ban.
Furthermore, the Federal Constitutional Court states in its ruling that dolls are frequently found in connection with other crimes against children, and that this is an indication that the use of dolls increases the risk of abuse. Here, the court cites the opinion of Prosecutor Dr. Bussweiler, who was called as an expert witness during the legislative process. In her statement, Bussweiler had indicated that child sex dolls were increasingly being discovered during criminal investigations and concluded that this likely lowers inhibitions. In addition, the court refers to figures from the United Kingdom, according to which child pornography was also found in 75% of cases involving doll owners who had come to criminal justice attention.
However, now that crimes involving child sex dolls have begun to appear in crime statistics, serious doubts have arisen regarding Bussweiler’s claim. For example, the police crime statistics for 2025 record over 41,000 cases of child pornography and more than 17,000 cases of child abuse, but only 52 cases involving child sex dolls. In almost all investigations into sexual violence against children, child sex dolls therefore cannot have played a role, which seriously calls into question the claims made by Bussweiler in her statement. The ruling does not indicate that the court critically examined Bussweiler’s arguments or conducted its own research.
Equally questionable are the figures cited from the United Kingdom, because the fact that child pornography was often found in the possession of people under investigation for child sex dolls does not in any way imply that the use of dolls makes the consumption of child pornography more likely. Fundamentally, figures from a society in which child sex dolls are criminalized say nothing about what the situation would be if they were legalized. If a ban on child sex dolls were to increase the risk of sexual violence against children, co-occurring offenses would be exactly what one would expect. Furthermore, a distortion of the figures is likely, as criminal investigators presumably prioritize cases in which someone is suspected of both child pornography and child sex dolls—a point also noted in the article cited by the Federal Constitutional Court. Ultimately, this amounts to a conflation of causation and correlation and thus constitutes yet another logical fallacy. However, within the scope of its discretion, the legislature is not authorized to draw such erroneous conclusions, as Judge Offenloch also points out in his dissenting opinion.
Finally, the Federal Constitutional Court asserts that the suppression of sexual impulses is best practice in the treatment of pedophiles. This suggests that the use of child sex dolls could intensify the desire for real-life experiences, which would justify criminalization (para. 63). The court cites a research paper by the Berlin Institute for Public and Private Security, which in turn cites an article by a legal scholar from 2019.
However, this indirectly cited article constructs this supposed “best practice” solely on the basis that the “Kein Täter Werden” program does not work with alternatives to sexual gratification, but instead suppresses sexual desires through means such as medication and chemical castration. This overlooks the fact that medication is used by KTW only as a supplement in individual cases and by no means constitutes the standard treatment for all pedophiles. Furthermore, by no means do all pedophiles require therapy. Even the professional consensus suggested by the article is by no means universal: Psychologist James Cantor, for example, has publicly opposed a ban on child sex dolls, and even KTW had not issued a recommendation for a ban as of 2020. It seems highly strange that the Federal Constitutional Court would derive sweeping statements about the treatment of pedophiles from an article written by a lawyer, rather than seeking expert opinions or conducting a broader literature review. In any case, it is extremely questionable to make the granting of general fundamental rights contingent on how people with mental illness are treated in a therapy program in individual cases.
In summary, the “inhibition threshold” argument rests on extremely shaky ground. There is no empirical evidence to support it, as the Federal Constitutional Court itself and most of the sources cited in the ruling also point out. The BVerfG’s reasoning is characterized by constant cherry-picking: while the opinions of individuals who perceive a danger in dolls—even if they cannot substantiate this claim with expert evidence—are given undue weight, contrary evidence from peer-reviewed studies published in scientific journals is largely ignored. This is particularly evident in the fact that Dr. Bussweiler’s statement is given significant weight in the ruling, while the reasoning behind the ruling ignores that all five other experts at the time took a critical or even opposed stance toward a ban, as well as in the fact that the only expert opinions cited are those that consider dolls to be at least potentially dangerous. The ruling thus also represents a clear rejection of the often-called-for evidence-based criminal policy, since, according to the Federal Constitutional Court’s reasoning, empirical evidence for criminal law prohibitions is not necessary at all.
The Abolition of the Core Area of Private Life
A significant portion of the ruling addresses the question of whether the use of child sex dolls still falls within the core sphere of private life. This core sphere is a particularly protected aspect of the general right of personality. While personality rights are generally weighed against other rights and may be restricted in the course of this balancing, the core sphere is absolutely protected; thus, the state may not intervene here under any circumstances. The core sphere includes, in particular, forms of sexual expression, but only if they do not infringe on the rights of others—masturbation to images of child abuse therefore does not fall within this core sphere, even if it takes place in private and has no direct external impact, since it violates the rights of children.
According to the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court, the use of child sex dolls in private settings also does not fall within this core area. The court justifies this by stating that it cannot be ruled out that the use of child sex dolls may increase the risk of real-life sexual assaults (see above). However, this potentially increased risk is sufficient to establish a social connection, even if the use of the dolls itself takes place in private.
This immediately raises the question: for most people, the use of sex toys for masturbation is likely one of the most private and intimate aspects of their lives. So what, if not that, should be considered part of the core sphere of private life?
The justification for this social justification is extremely flimsy. The use of dolls does not involve behavior that harms others (unlike, for example, child abuse) or that requires harm to third parties as a prerequisite (unlike, for example, depictions of child abuse). It is not even a matter of behavior that makes harmful behavior in the future sufficiently likely, as would be the case, for example, with the (strangely enough, completely legal) consumption of alcohol. Instead, the issue is that it cannot be ruled out with absolute certainty that the use of dolls might, in some individuals, increase the likelihood of harmful behavior. But if this flimsy justification is sufficient to shift hidden masturbatory acts from the private sphere into the realm of public interest and government regulation, then effectively everything is potentially removed from the realm of private life, and the absolutely protected core sphere is de facto abolished. Who can argue, for example, that consensual BDSM sex never normalizes sexual violence and definitely cannot lower the threshold for such behavior, and thus deserves protection from government intervention?
Finally, the Federal Constitutional Court’s reasoning also fails to recognize that the use of dolls does not necessarily have a sufficient social context, even if it were to increase the risk of assaults. Any assaults are acts separate from the use of dolls, requiring a distinct decision to commit them; there is certainly no automatic mechanism by which the use of dolls directly leads to assaultive behavior. Offenloch also points this out in his dissenting opinion (para. 11) and therefore compares the external impact of doll use to “evil thoughts.” Furthermore, Offenloch notes that, according to the Federal Constitutional Court’s previous case law, a social connection actually exists only when an act “in and of itself” already has points of contact with the community or other individuals. The Senate majority thus drastically departs from its own previous case law in order to justify a social relevance here on the basis of an extremely flimsy justification—without which a ban on dolls would have to be rejected a priori.
On the Proportionality of Interference with Fundamental Rights
In principle, the Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) acknowledges that the ban constitutes an infringement on personal rights, in particular the right to sexual self-determination. However, since—according to the BVerfG’s reasoning—the doll ban does not fall within the absolutely protected core area of private life (see above), restrictions on these rights are generally permissible provided they are well-founded. Since the protection of children is a particularly high-priority interest—one that the state not only has the right to ensure but is also obligated to ensure—the Federal Constitutional Court holds that the infringement of fundamental rights caused by the doll ban is, in principle, justified and proportionate. Preventing the sexualization of children and the fact that a lowering of inhibitions cannot be ruled out are sufficient to adequately justify the infringement of fundamental rights in the name of child protection as a supreme interest (para. 133 et seq.).
As already explained, the justification for a ban is as flimsy as it could possibly be. It is not convincing that doll owners are unable to distinguish between dolls and humans, nor is there any empirical evidence of a danger; equally unconvincing is the argument that child sex dolls undermine children’s dignity or normalize sexual contact between children and adults. The fact that this flimsy basis is deemed sufficient for an invasive encroachment on fundamental rights is alarming and has implications that extend far beyond the issue of dolls in the narrow sense. In effect, this amounts to a reversal of the burden of proof: instead of the legislature having to demonstrate the necessity of a ban through verifiable evidence of harm—as should be the case in a liberal constitutional state—those affected by the ban must prove that no harm can definitely result. According to the Federal Constitutional Court’s reasoning, even an infringement on the right to physical integrity could in principle be justified (para. 138), which in turn raises the question of whether, by that logic, even the forced castration of pedophiles could be constitutionally justified in order to prevent the sexualization of children.
Just how low this threshold for intervention is can also be seen from the fact that, according to the Federal Constitutional Court, the ban on dolls would be justified even if a lowering of the inhibition threshold were to be presumed only among a portion of the users (para. 121). Combined with the selective use of biased expert opinions (see above), this implies that interventions affecting the fundamental rights of pedophiles would be considered unconstitutional only if it could be ruled out with absolute certainty that the risk of behavior harmful to children could be increased in absolutely no one, and if all expert opinions were unanimously opposed to such interventions—a standard that is practically impossible to meet.
Ultimately, this ruling establishes a legal precedent that allows virtually any fundamental right to be taken away on flimsy grounds. Against the backdrop of societal stigmatization—which already treats the mere existence of pedophiles as a danger to children—a supposed conflict between the rights of pedophiles and the protection of children can be quickly fabricated. The Federal Constitutional Court has now made it clear that a well-founded justification for this fabricated danger is not necessary. However, in a balancing of the rights of pedophiles against the protection of children, child protection will always prevail, no matter how flimsy the evidence for an alleged threat actually is—thereby making it possible to restrict any right or freedom. In any case, the reasoning in the ruling does not make clear where the red lines lie in the balancing of personal rights against supposed child protection—or whether there are any red lines at all. This could also affect areas that have nothing to do with sexuality—such as programs for sex education, information, or self-help. Prof. Beier has already provided the rationale for this as well; together with KTW press spokesperson Maximilian von Heyden, he wrote that some self-help groups “reinforce cognitive distortions” and, through “mutual reinforcement of problematic attitudes,” can ultimately “increase the risk of sexual assault.”
In some places, the Federal Constitutional Court ultimately attempts to argue that the infringement on fundamental rights is not as invasive as the petitioners have portrayed it. In this regard, the court states that the ban on sex dolls does not prohibit thoughts or fantasies, but only certain forms of masturbation (para. 134). Furthermore, it is not necessary that emotional needs for physical closeness be satisfied exclusively with a sex doll (para. 136). This argument seems downright grotesque, given that the court itself explains in detail that a legitimate goal of the doll ban is to prevent children from becoming part of adult sexuality. In any case, the Federal Constitutional Court’s reasoning does not reveal any stance of tolerance toward pedophilic fantasies. It is possible that the court is instead aiming to suggest that sexuality with adults is also possible for pedophiles. Ultimately, however, this would be analogous to justifying the criminalization of homosexual relationships on the grounds that homosexuals can also enter into heterosexual partnerships. For core pedophiles in particular, basic human needs for physical closeness can only be fully satisfied with children, and it remains unclear—and the court does not elaborate further—what alternatives are supposed to remain after the criminalization of dolls. Since for pedophiles, and especially core pedophiles, there are not many opportunities to act out their own sexuality. For core pedophiles in particular, basic human needs for physical closeness can only be fully satisfied with children, and it remains unclear—and the court does not elaborate further—what alternatives are supposed to remain after the criminalization of dolls. Since many opportunities for pedophiles—and especially core pedophiles—to express their sexuality and fulfill basic human needs that most people take for granted are ruled out from the outset, the criminalization of any remaining alternative constitutes a particularly severe infringement; yet the court shows no understanding of this whatsoever.
This is particularly problematic in light of the “ultima ratio” principle, according to which criminal law may only be used as the legislature’s last and most severe resort, after all other means have been exhausted. Above all, a balance must be maintained between the legislature’s objectives and the intrusiveness of the infringements on fundamental rights. As outlined above, the infringements are severe and affect the core of one’s personality and sexuality. On the other hand, the infringement is justified primarily by the moral goal of preventing the sexualization of children. However, whether morality is a legitimate goal at all is highly controversial, and legal scholars in particular have criticized the decision on the basis of this principle.
Finally, the assertion that it is “not apparent” that the ban on dolls would contribute to the stigmatization or ostracism of pedophiles (para. 134) is also marked by a particular degree of ignorance. The court falls back on the argument that it is merely criminalizing masturbatory behavior. However, this ban cannot be viewed in isolation: It is based on the stigmatization of pedophiles and, conversely, reinforces it. As the court itself impressively demonstrates, the ban is based on the stance that children must not become objects of adult sexuality. For pedophiles, however, this is simply the case, and nothing can be done to change it. The argument thus calls for the eradication of pedophilic desire and is an expression of a struggle against pedophilia itself, as well as of society’s desire to punish all those who may find children sexually attractive. The court is taking far too simplistic an approach by limiting itself solely to the act of masturbation—which is directly criminalized—without taking into account the social context or the debates surrounding the ban, thereby demonstrating, above all, an absolute unwillingness to engage more deeply with the social position and stigmatization of pedophiles.
